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SIMMERING ON THE "BACKBURNER": THE
CHALLENGE OF YARBROUGH
Gerald F. Uelmen *
I. INTRODUCTION
A. The Case Law Leading to the Question
In Yarbrough v. Superior Court,1 California courts were confronted
with the following question: can lawyers be compelled to accept appoint-
ments to represent indigents in complex civil cases without reimburse-
ment for expenses or compensation? Or at least that is the question to
which California lawyers expected an answer.
Terry Val Yarbrough is serving a term of 17 years to life at Folsom
Prison, after conviction of second degree murder. He was named as a
defendant in a wrongful death suit brought by the minor child of the
victim.' In 1976, the California Supreme Court held, in Payne v. Supe-
rior Court,3 that an indigent prisoner who is named as a defendant in a
civil suit has a right to the appointment of counsel if his access to the
court is otherwise limited. Relying on this precedent, Yarbrough re-
quested the appointment of counsel to represent him in his civil case.
The trial court held a hearing on the issue of appointment of counsel and
found that five private attorneys had declined to provide representation
without compensation or reimbursement of expenses due to the complex-
ity of the investigation the case would require and the substantial ad-
vanced costs it would demand. The contract public defender who
represented Yarbrough in the criminal proceedings also informed the
court that he was so overburdened with other pro bono matters that he
could not represent Yarbrough with reasonable diligence.4 The trial
* B.A. 1962, Loyola Marymount University; J.D. 1965, LL.M. 1966, Georgetown Uni-
versity. Professor, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles, California. Professor Uelmen argued the
case of Yarbrough v. Superior Court before the California Supreme Court, appearing as counsel
for amicus curiae California Attorneys for Criminal Justice. The assistance of Paula Bailey,
Loyola Law Schol '86, in the preparation of this article is gratefully acknowledged.
1. 39 Cal. 3d 197, 702 P.2d 583, 216 Cal. Rptr. 425 (1985).
2. Id. at 201, 702 P.2d at 585, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 427. The suit also named the Brass Rail
Bar, where the homicide occurred, and its owner and bartender as co-defendants. Id.
3. 17 Cal. 3d 908, 553 P.2d 565, 132 Cal. Rptr. 405 (1976).
4. Under California law, public defenders can be appointed to provide representation in
only certain specified civil cases. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 27706 (West 1968 & Supp. 1985). See
Littlefield v. Superior Court, 98 Cal. App. 3d 652, 160 Cal. Rptr. 175 (1979).
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court concluded that while Yarbrough was entitled to appointment of
counsel under Payne, the court lacked authority to order compensation
or reimbursement of counsel. The trial court declined to make a coercive
appointment without compensation or reimbursement.'
On application for a writ of mandate to Division Five of the First
District Court of Appeal, the trial court was ordered to make an appoint-
ment of counsel. The court of appeal felt bound by dicta in Payne which
suggested attorneys must serve gratuitously until the legislature decides
otherwise.6 Concurring, Justice King expressed the hope that "our
Supreme Court will reexamine the issue of court appointment of counsel
as it relates to the supplemental issues of compensation for counsel and
of a source of costs for the actual expenses of litigation." 7
A storm of protest from the organized bar greeted the court of ap-
peal's ruling.' When the California Supreme Court granted a hearing,
no fewer than two dozen bar associations and lawyer organizations filed
amicus briefs urging the recognition of a right to compensation and reim-
bursement for appointed lawyers.9
Before the supreme court could rule in Yarbrough, two more cases
squarely presented similar issues. In Mowrer v. Superior Court,1  Divi-
sion Six of the Second District Court of Appeal confronted an order ap-
pointing an assistant public defender to represent an indigent father
named as a defendant in a civil paternity suit. The California Supreme
Court had recognized a right to appointed counsel for indigents named in
paternity cases in Salas v. Cortez. 1 In Mowrer, the supreme court
5. 150 Cal. App. 3d 388, 390, 197 Cal. Rptr. 737, 738-39 (1983).
6. Id. at 391, 197 Cal. Rptr. at 739-40. The California Supreme Court in Payne stated
that:
The state ... apparently assumes that if this court orders counsel appointed in cer-
tain cases, it will mandate that counsel be paid from public funds. We do not assert
such power. If and how counsel will be compensated is for the Legislature to decide.
Until that body determines that appointed counsel may be compensated from public
funds in civil cases, attorneys must serve gratuitously in accordance with their statu-
tory duty not to reject "the cause of the defenseless or the oppressed."
17 Cal. 3d at 920 n.6, 553 P.2d at 579 n.6, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 414 n.6 (quoting CAL. Bus. &
PROF. CODE § 6068(h) (West 1968 & Supp. 1985)).
7. 150 Cal. App. 3d at 393, 197 Cal. Rptr. at 743-44 (King, J., concurring). Cf. County
of Fresno v. Superior Court, 82 Cal. App. 3d 191, 197, 146 Cal. Rptr. 880, 883 (1978).
8. See Hager, Free- Work Order Alarms Lawyers, L.A. Times, Jan. 29, 1984, Part I, at 3,
col. 3; Hanst, Yarbrough's Potential for Harm, CAL. LAW., July 1984, at 8; Snider, Counsel by
Conscription, L.A. LAW., June 1984, at 18; Uelmen, Attorneys as a Public Resource, CAL.
LAW., Jan. 1984, at 9.
9. Yarbrough, 39 Cal. 3d at 201 n.1, 702 P.2d at 585 n.1, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 427 n.l.
10. 155 Cal. App. 3d 262, 201 Cal. Rptr. 893 (1984).
11. 24 Cal. 3d 22, 593 P.2d 226, 154 Cal. Rptr. 529, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 900 (1979). The
Salas court made no reference to the issue of compensation or reimbursement, an omission
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granted a writ of mandate to compel the superior court to vacate the
appointment, and to either appoint a volunteer willing to serve without
compensation or dismiss the action.12 The court concluded that an order
compelling any attorney to serve without compensation would be a de-
nial of equal protection of the law, since "the government seeks to charge
the cost of operation of a state function conducted for the benefit of the
public to a particular class."' 3
Then, in Jaffe v. Superior Court,4 a Los Angeles attorney who had
devoted years of service as a volunteer handling paternity and child sup-
port cases by court appointment submitted a bill seeking compensation of
$350 for one case. The superior court refused to order payment, but
wrote a sympathetic opinion outlining the reasons why the attorney
should be paid. The Second District Court of Appeal summarily denied
an application for a writ.15 The California Supreme Court granted hear-
ings in both Mowrer and Jaffe. 6
Meanwhile, the California State Bar busily lobbied the legislature to
respond to the crisis. The result was Senate Bill 2057, sponsored by Sen-
ator Petris, which was introduced on February 16, 1984. The bill appro-
priated $1,000,000 for compensation and reimbursement of attorneys
"involuntarily appointed" to provide representation in civil actions
"whenever an indigent party.., has the constitutional right to be repre-
sented by counsel." 17 The bill limited the rate of compensation to a max-
imum of $60 per hour, creating a presumption "that the lowest rate for
appointed counsel in the county is the reasonable rate."' 8 The bill passed
the Senate by a vote of twenty-seven to eleven, passed the Assembly by a
vote of fifty-five to seventeen, and then was vetoed by Governor
Deukmejian on September 28, 1984.19
The Yarbrough case was argued before the supreme court on No-
vember 7, 1984. The court announced its decision eight months later.
The court reaffirmed its Payne holding, but explained that that holding
which was caustically noted in Justice Richardson's dissent: "The majority is strangely silent
on the critical question-who is going to pay for counsel? Is it to be, as in Payne, a pro bono
responsibility of the bar? Is it the legislature which must appropriate for it from public
funds?" Id. at 42, 593 P.2d at 239, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 542 (Richardson, J., dissenting).
12. 155 Cal. App. 3d at 274-75, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 901.
13. Id. at 267, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 896.
14. No. B002890 (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. of Cal. (1984)).
15. No. 31874 (Cal. Ct. App. (2d Dist.) (1984)).
16. Minutes of California Supreme Court, July 12, 1984, 36 Cal. 3d Advance Sheets, No.
22 (Aug. 9, 1984), pp. 17-18.
17. Cal. S.B. 2057, 1983-84 Reg. Sess., § 1 (1983).
18. Id.
19. Cal. Legislature, Senate Final History, 1983-84 Reg. Sess., p. 1252.
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mandates the appointment of counsel only for "the unusual case where
future property rights are genuinely at stake."' 2' Noting that the findings
required to justify appointment of counsel are nonadversarial, the court
demanded a searching inquiry into the potential loss to the prisoner,
"weighing such factors as age, term of incarceration, employment his-
tory, education, skills, family background and the likelihood of inheriting
or otherwise obtaining property. ' 21 The case was remanded to the trial
court for reconsideration of these factors. With respect to the issues of
compensation and reimbursement for appointed attorneys, the court de-
clined to rule, expressing the hope that a "fair legislative solution" can be
found:
It is our hope that the Legislature, working closely with the
State Bar and other interested groups, will use the respite af-
forded by our disposition on this case to enact a fair legislative
solution to the vexing problems which, for the time being, have
been placed on the judicial backburner.22
Thus, the Yarbrough holding failed to dispose of the unanswered
questions left by the Mowrer and Jaffe cases. These questions may also
be left simply to simmer on the backburner until the remand hearing in
Yarbrough is completed. In dissenting, Chief Justice Bird expressed the
suspicion that "these problems will not disappear nor will they become
any more tractable with the passage of time."
'23
The court's disposition of Yarbrough poses a formidable challenge.
To the extent that Yarbrough conveys the message that the appointment
of counsel will rarely be justified for indigent prisoners, the costs of meet-
ing the challenge may be substantially lower than previously envisioned.
On the other hand, the cost of providing counsel for indigent defendants
in paternity and child support cases cannot be minimized in the same
way. As the court stressed in Yarbrough, the "keystone" of the Payne
holding was access to the courts, not the "right to counsel.",24 Thus, the
appointment of counsel could be limited on an ad hoc basis to unusual
cases.25 The Salas holding, on the other hand, is clearly premised on a
20. 39 Cal. 3d 197, 201, 702 P.2d 583, 585, 216 Cal. Rptr. 425, 427 (1985).
21. Id. at 205, 702 P.2d at 588, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 430.
22. Id. at 207, 702 P.2d at 589, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 431.
23. Id. at 207-08, 702 P.2d at 590, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 432 (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
24. Id. at 201, 702 P.2d at 585, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 427.
25. In this respect, the Yarbrough ruling is strikingly similar to Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S.
455 (1942), in which the United States Supreme Court limited the right to counsel in criminal
cases to situations in which the defendant was "at a serious disadvantage by reason of lack of
counsel." Id. at 472-73. Ironically, one of the arguments posited by the Bells majority for this
limited "special circumstances" approach was that since the fourteenth amendment due pro-
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constitutional right to counsel, with the only prerequisite being a show-
ing of indigency.26 Clearly, the issues simmering on the backburner tran-
scend the problem of Yarbrough.
B. The Conference on Financing the Right to Counsel
In January of 1985, more than 100 bar leaders, legislators and
county government officials convened in Sacramento to discuss the
problems of financing the right to counsel in California.27 The confer-
ence was co-sponsored by the State Bar of California, California Attor-
neys for Criminal Justice, the American Bar Association Standing
Committee on Legal Aid and Indigent Defendants, and the bar associa-
tions of Los Angeles County, San Francisco and Sacramento. The
problems posed by Yarbrough, Mowrer and Jaffe were uppermost in the
minds of all who attended. This publication of the proceedings of that
conference should make much constructive thought available at a time
when it is most sorely needed. Each of the conference speakers ap-
proached the problem from a unique perspective. Ultimately, the confer-
ence participants reached a surprising consensus as to what was needed.
They candidly assessed the difficulty of meeting those needs in the reality
of today's political climate. The metaphor of a boiling pot sums it all up
very nicely.
The greatest challenge, as noted by Assembly Speaker Willie
Brown,2 8 stems from a "political atmosphere" which attaches low prior-
ity to the quality of justice meted out to indigents. How does one go
about changing the "political atmosphere"?
The best place to start is by turning down the flame under the boil-
ing pot to reduce the temperature. The problem must be assessed in a
climate of cold history, cold ethics, cold economics and cold politics.
Hopefully, these conference proceedings will make a positive contribu-
tion to such an analysis.
cess clause protects property as well as life and liberty, "if we hold with the petitioner logic
would require the furnishing of counsel in civil cases involving property." Id. at 473. In
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), Betts was condemned as "an anachronism when
handed down" and overruled. Id. at 345. See Israel, Gideon v. Wainwright: The "Art" of
Overruling, 1963 Sup. Cr. REV. 211. The "anachronism" was revived, however, in Gagnon v.
Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973) (holding that the right to counsel in probation and parole revo-
cation proceedings must be assessed on a "case by case" basis).
26. 24 Cal. 3d at 28-29, 593 P.2d at 230-31, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 533-34.
27. The transcripts of the Conference on Financing the Right to Counsel in California are
published in this issue of the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review. See infra Financing the Right
to Counsel in California, 19 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 325 (1985).
28. See id. at 417 (remarks of Assembly Speaker Willie L. Brown, Jr.).
Dec. 1985]
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II. SOME COLD HISTORY
Many of the proposals being considered to meet the challenge of
providing counsel to indigent civil litigants have been tried before. We
tend to forget that the system now in place for the representation of indi-
gent criminal defendants was the product of years of struggle in trial-
and-error fashion. Before we repeat the mistakes of the past, it may be
worthwhile to review the lessons of a century of experience.
A century ago, the right to appointed counsel in criminal cases was
implemented by the appointment of counsel to serve without compensa-
tion. The Yarbrough v. Superior Court case of a century ago was Rowe v.
Yuba County, 9 in which an early California lawyer sued the county for
compensation for the services he rendered to an accused indigent. The
attorney received the following lecture from Chief Justice Stephen Field:
[I]t is part of the general duty of counsel to render their profes-
sional services to persons accused of crime, who are destitute of
means, upon the appointment of the Court, when not inconsis-
tent with their obligations to others; and for compensation,
they must trust to the possible future ability of the parties.
Counsel are not considered at liberty to reject, under circum-
stances of this character, the cause of the defenseless, because
no provision for their compensation is made by law.30
The burden imposed by this system was not a heavy one. A relatively
small proportion of defendants were "paupers," and their cases could
often be disposed of quickly. Appointments were spread out among a
broad cross-section of the bar. In ruling that lawyers must serve without
compensation, Chief Justice Field confidently concluded: "The duty im-
posed in this way may, it is true, be carried to unreasonable lengths, so as
to become exceedingly burdensome; but we have heard no complaints of
this character.,
31
When counsel did have the temerity to complain, the response
clearly indicated that the best way to handle the burden was to do less for
the client. No better example can be found than that of George A.
29. 17 Cal. 61 (1860).
30. Id. at 63.
31. Id. Chief Justice Field apparently enjoyed delivering pompous lectures, a quality
much despised by his colleague, Justice David Terry. After Field was appointed to the United
States Supreme Court by President Abraham Lincoln, an angry encounter between Field and
Terry in a railway station near Stockton ended with Justice Field's bodyguard shooting and
killing Terry. R. KRONINGER, SARAH AND THE SENATOR 213-17 (1964). See In re Neagle,
135 U.S. 1 (1889). Thus it may have been Chief Justice Field's temperament, rather than the
generosity of the lawyers appearing before him, which accounted for his failure to hear any
complaints... at least when his bodyguard was nearby.
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Lamont, a lawyer practicing in Solano County in the 1870's who learned
this postulate the hard way. Assigned to represent a man accused of the
murder of a fellow worker, Lamont presented a defense of insanity based
on the defendant's paranoid delusion that he was being persecuted by
Catholics. Even after the defendant was convicted, Lamont continued
his investigation, discovering several other witnesses, procuring affida-
vits, presenting a motion for a new trial and ultimately appealing the case
to the California Supreme Court, which commended his "unusual dili-
gence."32 Seeking more than a judicial pat on the head as a reward for
his diligence, Lamont then brought suit against Solano County to recover
$1500 in compensation and $300 in costs for procuring the affidavits and
appealing the case. The court rejected his claim for compensation, citing
Rowe v. Yuba County, and adding:
In regard to the claim for moneys expended, counsel have not
cited any provision of the statute which would require an attor-
ney to make advances out of his own pocket in procuring affida-
vits while conducting the defense of a prisoner. He is simply to
give his professional services.33
As the burden of providing defense services through uncompensated
appointments grew, the quality of representation provided declined. In
the early part of this century, a movement to establish a paid staff of
lawyers to provide defense to indigents accused of crime began to achieve
some success. It is important to recognize that the impetus for this
movement was not the financial self-interest of lawyers, but a genuine
concern over the quality of representation being provided. The "cross-
section" of the bar providing representation was becoming smaller and
smaller, until it was reduced to a small cadre of the worst elements of the
bar.
34
32. People v. M'Donell, 47 Cal. 134, 137 (1873).
33. Lamont v. Solano County, 49 Cal. 158, 159 (1874).
34. M. GOLDMAN, THE PUBLIC DEFENDER 16 (1917).
The courts do appoint lawyers to defend such persons-but are they really de-
fended? These attorneys serve without compensation, except that in some states
a fee is paid in murder cases.... On very rare occasions distinguished counsel is
assigned to defend a prisoner, but, as a general rule, these assignments go to
young and inexperienced attorneys-very often to the practitioner who happens
to be in court at the time.... The classes of lawyers who are usually assigned to
defend, present a phase of this question which cannot be regarded as unimpor-
tant. It is a regrettable fact that in nearly all communities (particularly in the
larger cities) there is a type of lawyers who are not truly representative of a great
profession. Their regard for the rights and liberties of their clients is measured
solely from a commercial or financial standpoint. These are more persistent
than any other lawyers in their search for clients. Too frequently their services,
if rewarded by small fees, are half-hearted or openly negligible. This leaves their
clients practically or wholly unprotected. They are commonly referred to as
Dec. 1985]
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The public defender movement gained its first foothold in the nation
with the establishment of a public defender office in Los Angeles in
1914.1' One of the most vociferous proponents in California was Clara
Shortridge Foltz, the first woman admitted to the California bar.36 The
establishment of the Los Angeles public defender office produced a very
dramatic demonstration of the shortcomings of the previous system of
uncompensated appointments. A comparison of the performance of ap-
pointed lawyers in 1913 with the performance of public defenders in 1914
revealed:
(1) The number of cases handled more than doubled in one year.
Why?
The difference between the number of cases handled by the as-
signed attorneys in 1913 and the cases handled by the public
defender in 1914 cannot be accounted for by the growth of pop-
ulation. It is due to the fact that the lawyers who commonly
took the assignments were of such a low grade that the defend-
ants avoided them whenever it was possible. These men hung
about the jails and solicited business, but with the advent of the
public defender they have almost entirely disappeared.37
(2) The acquittal rate for the cases going to trial rose from 20%
when attorneys were not compensated to 34.5% when the public de-
fender was established.38
(3) While the rate of cases disposed of by guilty pleas increased
slightly, the sentencing results were much more favorable to
defendants.39
The ensuing spread of the public defender movement and corre-
"shysters," but also described . . . as "snitch lawyers," "jail lawyers," "vam-
pires," "legal vermin," "harpies" and by other inelegant but extremely emphatic
phraseology. They are grasping and mercenary-without character, ability or
conscience. They prey upon the ignorance or fear of the prisoner, or of his
relatives or friends, in their effort to extort a fee. If it be not forthcoming (or
often when it is) they advise the prisoner to plead guilty, on the pretext that he
will get greater leniency from the court than by standing trial. He may at times
go through the forms of a trial, but the defense is perfunctory on its face, and the
client pays the penalty, perhaps not for the crime charged, but often for his
poverty.
Id. at 16-20.
35. See Cuff, Public Defender System: The Los Angeles Story, 45 MINN. L. REv. 715
(1961).
36. Schwartz, Brandt & Milrod, Clara Shortridge Foltz: Pioneer in the Law, 27 HASTINGS
L.J. 545 (1976).
37. SMITH & BRADWAY, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BULL. No. 607, GROWTH OF LEGAL-
AID WORK IN THE UNITED STATES 90 (Rev. ed. 1936).
38. Id.
39. Id.
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sponding decline of the use of uncompensated assignments was well doc-
umented. A series of national studies analyzed the trend on a recurring
basis.
As part of a comprehensive study of legal education and the legal
profession financed by the Carnegie Foundation, Reginald Heber Smith
published Justice and the Poor in 1919.4 At that time, the public de-
fender movement was still a fledgling, with defender offices functioning
in only five United States cities.41 Smith found that courts universally
assigned counsel in murder cases, and that these attorneys were paid and
reimbursed for expenses in many states. In other felony cases, however,
he discovered that only half the states regularly assigned counsel, and
only seven states paid counsel or reimbursed expenses.42 Paradoxically,
he concluded that the system worked reasonably well in murder cases,
but failed dismally in other cases:
[T]he newspaper publicity which attends a murder trial gives a
lawyer the best advertising he can ever have and is just as valu-
able as a cash payment. The fact that the defendant's life is in
his hands naturally spurs the lawyer on. In a word, the case
appeals simultaneously to the lawyer's self-interest and to the
best traditions of his profession. The situation is reversed in
other cases. The prisoner arrested for burglary, rape, or assault
may arouse no sympathy, in fact the matter may be revolting.
More important, the average lawyer, however honest and desir-
ous of performing his professional obligations, cannot afford to
give a thorough defense. Even if he could devote several days'
time to the trial, he cannot pay out of his own pocket for inves-
tigators, detectives, and medical, handwriting or other ex-
perts. . . . The more well-to-do attorneys are entirely out of
criminal practice, and as they lack experience in this work are
virtually exempt from assignment.43
When Smith surveyed the scene again in 1936,4 he found the situa-
tion somewhat improved. As many as twenty cities now were served by
functioning public defender offices.45 He found that thirty-seven states
provided for assignment of counsel in felony cases, while twenty-nine
40. R. SMITH, JUSTICE AND THE POOR (1919).
41. Los Angeles (established in 1914); Portland (established in 1915); Omaha (established
in 1915); Columbus (established in 1916); and New York (established in 1917). Id. at 117.
42. Id. at 112-13.
43. Id.
44. SMITH & BRADWAY, supra note 37.
45. Id. at 87-88.
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states made such provision for misdemeanors. With respect to compen-
sation of appointed counsel, payment was allowed in twenty-six states,
but eight limited compensation to capital cases, while another five limited
compensation to felony cases.4 6 Thus, thirty states made no provision for
the payment of counsel assigned in non-capital felony cases. He also sur-
veyed the level of compensation:
The amount of compensation throws a curious light on the rel-
ative value set by the States on such matters. In capital cases
the lump-sum compensation ranges between $25 and $1000; in
felony cases between $25 and $50; in capital cases per diem
compensation averages about $20 or $25; and in felony cases
per diem compensation averages about $10. 4 7
Despite the low level of compensation, however, Smith concluded that
"paid assigned counsel did their work reasonably well." While acquittal
rates and sentencing results were "a little less favorable" than those ob-
tained by retained counsel, the discrepancy was "too small to warrant
any assumption that the assigned counsel were remiss or delinquent in
their duties."48 In assessing the performance of assigned counsel who
were not compensated, however, Smith's judgment was much harsher.
Smith's 1936 study also surveyed the extent of assignment of coun-
sel for civil cases, finding that twelve states authorized assignment of
counsel to indigents in civil cases by statute, but none provided compen-
sation, and assignments were rarely made. He found that the failure of
the unpaid assigned counsel system in the United States was consistent
with the experience in European countries which did not compensate ap-
pointed counsel.4 9 He concluded that the failure of legal aid in the
United States was not attributable to the assigned counsel system, but to
the general lack of provision for compensating assigned counsel:
The assignment plan in America has been an altogether inade-
quate solution, but it should not be abandoned. Potentially it
has great usefulness, and if reasonable compensation were al-
lowed to assigned attorneys the inherent weakness of the plan
as it now exists would be removed.50
From 1956 to 1959, with a grant from the Fund for the Republic, a
special committee of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York
and the National Legal Aid and Defender Association undertook a com-
46. Id. at 77.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 92-93.
49. Id. at 28.
50. Id. at 30.
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prehensive study of alternative systems for providing counsel to indigents
in criminal cases." The survey of various state systems disclosed that
the number of public defender offices had steadily increased from thirty-
eight to eighty-eight between 1951 and 1956.52 The assigned counsel sys-
tem was still the prevailing system, however, serving over half the total
population of the United States.53 But the prevalence and level of com-
pensation for assigned counsel had changed little in the twenty years
since Smith's .1936 survey: "No provision for the payment of counsel
assigned in non-capital cases is found in twenty-seven states. Most of the
remaining states provide only token payments which are grossly unremu-
nerative for the services performed. Frequently the payments do not
cover the expenses of counsel."54
In making a qualitative assessment of the services provided by as-
signed counsel, the study relied upon field surveys of county-wide areas
in New York state and New Jersey. The study concluded that the most
serious defect of the system of uncompensated assigned counsel was its
failure to provide experienced, competent and zealous representation.
This failure was attributed to a fundamental assumption that "every law-
yer is equally qualified to handle criminal cases." 5
This assumption was largely correct in the smaller communities
of eighteenth and early nineteenth century America. As long
as the assigned-counsel system functioned in a predominantly
rural society in which the practice of law was not specialized,
the experience of most members of the bar was similar and al-
most every attorney could be expected to have sufficient knowl-
edge of criminal practice to prepare and present an adequate
defense.
56
The field surveys revealed that 43.4% of Essex County, New Jersey law-
yers and 33.3% of Thompson County, New York lawyers assigned to
criminal cases had no criminal law experience prior to their first assign-
ment. 7 Thus, the system was offering training to young lawyers, but
hardly offering competent representation to clients. The dilemma could
not be resolved by limiting appointments to experienced lawyers, since
that "would place an unjustified burden upon a small segment of the
51. ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, SPECIAL COMM. TO STUDY
DEFENDER SYSTS., EQUAL JUSTICE FOR THE ACCUSED (1959).
52. Id. at 134 n.1.
53. Id. at 48.
54. Id. at 120 n.6.
55. Id. at 65.
56. Id.
57. Id.
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Bar."58 The lack of adequate compensation and reimbursement for in-
vestigative expenses, it was noted, put economic pressure on an ap-
pointed attorney "to dispose of his assignment with as little investigation
and as hastily as possible."59
Shortly after the landmark decision in Gideon v. Wainwright6 man-
dated that counsel be supplied to indigents in all felony cases, the Ameri-
can Bar Foundation undertook a monumental survey based on thousands
of personal interviews and questionnaires administered in every state.
61
This survey indicated that the number of public defender offices had then
grown to 117.62 However, in 2900 of the 3100 counties (93%) in the
United States, where 70% of felony defendants resided, the use of as-
signed counsel still prevailed. 63 The Foundation's survey reported a dra-
matic improvement in the availability of compensation, although the
rates were still parsimonious. In thirty-five states, counsel were paid for
all felony cases. Only six states did not authorize payment; and four
states limited payment to capital cases. The three remaining states fol-
lowed a system of local option.' 4 Most states placed a maximum limit on
fees, ranging in noncapital cases from $25 to $500.65 Still it was noted
that since Gideon, fourteen states had increased compensation for ap-
pointed counsel or had provided compensation for the first time.66 While
data from many counties showed a substantially higher guilty plea rate
for defendants represented by appointed counsel compared to retained
counsel, 67 the most telling criticism of the appointed counsel system was
the lack of reimbursement for investigative expenses:
[I]t is one thing for an attorney to donate his time to a worth-
while cause and another to perform the task inadequately be-
cause of lack of funds to cover out-of-pocket expenditures.
There is no means by which he can obtain an expert witness
except by payment from his own pocket. Only nine states and
the District of Columbia specifically provide for reimbursement
of expenses, although in other states the judge may take such
expenses into account in awarding the attorney fee. The result
58. Id. at 66.
59. Id. at 67.
60. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
61. See 1 L. SILVERSTEIN, DEFENSE OF THE POOR IN CRIMINAL CASES IN AMERICAN
STATE COURTS (1965).
62. Id. at 41.
63. Id. at 15.
64. Id. at 16.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 150.
67. Id. at 21.
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of the variations among systems is that most appointed lawyers
are forced to subsidize the administration of justice by paying
such costs, while other appointees are reimbursed in part, and
still others are repaid in full.68
Even in counties where the level of compensation was relatively high, the
change most frequently recommended by the lawyers surveyed was that
attorneys be paid more for their services so as to improve the system of
assigned counsel.69
In 1973, the National Legal Aid and Defender Organization fielded
a major survey of indigent defense systems, which disclosed that the
number of counties primarily relying on assigned counsel had declined to
72%.70 A total of 650 public defender offices served 883 counties, en-
compassing 64% of the population served.71 The survey canvassed the
opinions of judges, prosecutors and defense lawyers in a broad cross-
section of counties utilizing both systems, and found an overwhelming
preference for the full-time public defender as the "ideal" system. The
criticisms of the assigned counsel system sounded like a familiar refrain.
Although only 5% of the judges surveyed reported they had no funds to
reimburse appointed counsel, the most frequently voiced recommenda-
tion for improvement was to increase compensation for appointed coun-
sel, followed by an increase in resources for better investigation.72 Over
two-thirds of the judges reported that public funds were unavailable to
hire investigators to assist appointed counsel.73 The survey revealed that
the lawyers who received appointments were seldom experienced crimi-
nal practitioners. Two-thirds of the 815 reporting attorneys indicated
that they handled "very few" criminal cases, and three-fourths had never
attended a seminar to keep abreast of new developments in criminal law
and procedure.74
The most recent survey of indigent defense services was published
by the Bureau of Justice Statistics of the United States Department of
Justice in 1984. 7' The survey disclosed that the public defender system
continues as the dominant method of providing counsel to indigents,
68. Id. at 29-30 (footnote omitted).
69. Id. at 33.
70. NATIONAL LEGAL AID AND DEFENDER ASS'N, THE OTHER FACE OF JUSTICE 9
(1973).
71. Id. at 13.
72. Id. at 52.
73. Id. at 44.
74. Id.
75. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, A NATIONAL SURVEY,
CRIMINAL DEFENSE SYSTEMS (1984).
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although its rate of growth has slowed considerably. Forty-three of the
fifty largest counties are served by public defenders, and 68% of the
United States population is now served. Assigned counsel systems still
dominate in rural areas, including 60% of counties in this country.
7 6
Virtually all of the assigned counsel systems provide compensation for
the assigned lawyers, most frequently at $30-40 per hour for in-court
time, $20-30 for out-of-court time. Forty percent of counties establish
maximum limits for fees, generally between $500 and $1000 for felonies,
and between $200 and $500 for misdemeanors."
The most startling finding was the rise in the proportion of cases in
which the public defender declared unavailability due to conflict of inter-
est. The courts have applied much stricter standards as to what consti-
tutes a conflict between co-defendants.78 If a conflict exists, the public
defender's office can only represent one of the co-defendants. 7 9 Since
there are multiple defendants in approximately 25% of all adult felony
cases, 80 an alternative source of counsel is frequently a necessity. In most
jurisdictions, alternative counsel is supplied by appointment of assigned
counsel. Thus, systems of assigned counsel and public defender offices
often coexist in the same jurisdiction. The survey found that, in a grow-
ing number of counties, alternative counsel for conflicts-and sometimes
the primary source of appointed counsel-are provided by a fixed-fee
contract, in which an attorney agrees to handle all such cases for a fixed
sum.8' The increasing use of this system has raised concern that a flat-
fee rate of compensation may discourage lawyers from pursuing full in-
vestigation and litigation in the cases which require more than routine
effort.8 2 These concerns motivated the American Bar Association to
adopt a policy recommending that "cost alone" not be the criterion for
awarding such contracts.8 3
The historical evolution of our present system of providing counsel
76. Id. at 2.
77. Id. at 5.
78. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980); Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (1978);
People v. Mrozcko, 35 Cal. 3d 86, 672 P.2d 835, 192 Cal. Rptr. 52 (1983).
79. Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (1978). See also Geer, Representation of Multiple
Criminal Defendants:' Conflicts of Interest and the Professional Responsibilities of the Defense
Attorney, 62 MINN. L. REV. 119 (1978); Tague, Multiple Representation and Conflicts of Inter-
est in Criminal Cases, 67 GEO. L.J. 1075 (1979).
80. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 75, at 4.
81. Id. at 5-6.
82. See, e.g., STANDING COMM. ON THE DELIVERY OF LEGAL SERVS. TO CRIM. DEFEND-
ANTS, LEGAL SERVS. SECTION, STATE BAR OF CAL., REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION TO
THE BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE STATE BAR OF CAL., INDIGENT CRIMINAL DEFENSE SERV-
ICES IN CALIFORNIA (Nov. 1984) [hereinafter cited as STANDING COMMITTEE].
83. 36 CRIM. L. RvrR. 2427 (1985).
YARBROUGH v. SUPERIOR COURT
to indigents in criminal cases reveals an inexorable trend away from the
system of uncompensated appointments which prevailed a century ago.
The suggestion that we meet the challenge to provide counsel to indigent
civil litigants by resurrecting that system ignores the momentous changes
which accompanied, indeed compelled, that trend. First, the shift from
uncompensated appointments to public defenders paralleled a massive
shift from a rural population to an urban one. In 1880, about 28% of the
population in this country resided in communities designated as urban.84
In 1970, the figure was 73.5%.8" Today, the system of assigned counsel
still prevails predominantly in rural counties.86 The public defender sys-
tem predominates in urban counties simply because it is a more efficient
vehicle for the delivery of legal services where the demand for those serv-
ices is great.
Secondly, the shift reflects an enormous change in the character of
the bar. A century ago, the vast majority of lawyers were general practi-
tioners who were equally comfortable trying a criminal case and drafting
a commercial contract. Appointments could be spread out among the
bar because lawyers were almost a fungible commodity. Today, the era
of specialization means that only a small portion of the bar can compe-
tently respond to the need for appointed lawyers. The use of public de-
fenders increases the level of competency, because the lawyers assigned
to represent indigents are themselves specialists. A final trend worth not-
ing is the growth of the proportion of the population which qualifies as
"indigent." Ten years ago, less than 50% of all criminal defendants
qualified as indigents. Today, the figure ranges from 55% to 60%."l
In the face of these trends, the suggestion that a system of uncom-
pensated appointments of counsel can meet the challenge of providing
legal representation to indigents in civil cases is akin to the suggestion
that we can solve the problem of smog produced by internal combustion
engines by returning to the use of horses and buggies. Our problem has
simply outgrown that solution.
III. SOME COLD ETHICS
Some courts have suggested that counsel possess an ethical obliga-
84. 18 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRiTrANICA 974 (15th ed. 1974) (communities with a population
in excess of 2,500 are designated as "urban").
85. Id. at 1076.
86. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 75, at 4 ("Assigned counsel systems...
predominate in small counties with fewer than 50,000 residents.").
87. Gideon Undone: The Crisis in Indigent Defense Spending, Transcript of a Hearing on
the Crisis in Indigent Defense Funding held during the Annual Conference of the National
Legal Aid and Defender Association, at 1 (November, 1982).
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tion to serve without compensation by virtue of section 6068(h) of the
California Business and Professions Code, which provides that a lawyer
should not "reject 'the cause of the defenseless or the oppressed.' "88
This view is misguided; section 6068(h) lends no support whatever to the
proposition that lawyers owe an obligation to the state to accept appoint-
ments to serve without compensation. Section 6068 simply codifies an
Oath of Admission to the Bar which was first formulated for use in the
state of Washington and was adopted by the American Bar Association
in 1908.89 Many other states have a virtually identical statutory provi-
sion.90 The provision describing the duty not to reject the cause of the
defenseless or oppressed was clearly not intended to address the question
of compensation, but simply to describe the lawyer's obligation to repre-
sent the unpopular client. The best evidence of this is that among the
earliest states to adopt the oath by statute were three states which have
long recognized that attorneys appointed to represent indigents are con-
stitutionally entitled to compensation.9 Yet none of these three states
saw any inconsistency in defining the duties of attorneys in precisely the
same language utilized in section 6068(h). A growing number of other
states, including Kentucky92 and Nebraska,93 recognize a right to com-
pensation while continuing to utilize the A.B.A. Oath of Admission.
Even the State of Washington, where the oath originated a century ago
and is still required by both statute94 and rule,95 has joined the ranks of
those states which no longer countenance the appointment of counsel to
serve without compensation.96
The true meaning of the duty never to reject "the cause of the de-
fenseless or oppressed" was explored by former Yale Law School Dean
Eugene V. Rostow in the Morrison Lecture presented to the State Bar of
California in 1961.9' Describing the tradition of British barristers, who
88. Payne v. Superior Court, 17 Cal. 3d 908, 920 n.6, 553 P.2d 565, 574 n.6, 132 Cal. Rptr.
405, 416 n.6 (1976) (quoting CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6068(h) (West 1968 & Supp. 1985));
County of Tulare v. Ybarra, 143 Cal. App. 3d 580, 586-87, 192 Cal. Rptr. 49, 52-53 (1983);
County of Fresno v. Superior Court, 82 Cal. App. 3d 191, 194, 196, 146 Cal. Rptr. 880, 884
(1978).
89. See 33 RULES OF THE A.B.A. 584 (1908).
90. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 9.460(8) (1983).
91. Indiana, Iowa and Wisconsin were among the first states to adopt the oath. 33 RULES
OF THE A.B.A. 584 n.1 (1908). Cf. Webb v. Baird, 6 Ind. 13 (1854); Hall v. Washington Co., 2
Greene 473 (Iowa 1850); County of Dane v. Smith, 13 Wis. 654 (1861).
92. Bradshaw v. Ball, 487 S.W.2d 294 (Ky. 1972).
93. Kovarik v. County of Banner, 192 Neb. 816, 224 N.W.2d 761 (1975).
94. WASH. REV. CODE § 2.48.210 (1961).
95. WASH. RULES FOR ADMISSION TO PRACTICE, Rule 5(G) (1965).
96. Honore v. Board of Prison Terms & Paroles, 77 Wash. 2d 660, 466 P.2d 485 (1970).
97. Rostow, The Lawyer and His Client, 48 A.B.A. J. 25 (1962).
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are obligated to take every case that walks in the door, Dean Rostow
compared the barrister's role to that of a cab driver-"bound to answer
to the first hail." 98 Accompanying this tradition, however, is a govern-
mental commitment to provide- adequate compensation to the barristers
who take on representation of the indigent. 99 Dean Rostow then de-
scribed the very different tradition of American lawyers:
The code of ethics of the American Bar has never accepted the
British rule in its full majesty, even in criminal cases. Canon 31
of the Canons of Professional Ethics adopted by the American
Bar Association declares that "no lawyer is obliged to act either
as adviser or advocate for every person who may wish to be-
come his client. He has the right to decline employment." The
Canon stresses the lawyer's individual responsibility for ac-
cepting or declining requests for professional services. And it
makes no reference, directly or indirectly, to the principle of
the English rule as a factor the lawyer is to take into account in
exercising his responsibility. It should be added, however, that
the lawyer's oath, recommended by the American Bar Associa-
tion and widely used, contains these words: "I will never re-
ject, from any consideration personal to myself, the cause of the
defenseless or oppressed." At least one authority has said that
"where the English rule is obligation to accept except under
special circumstances, the American rule is obligation not to
refuse where special circumstances exist.' °
Dean Rostow concluded that the oath simply describes the aspira-
tion of American lawyers to strive for the ideal personified by John
Adams representing the British soldiers accused of the "Boston
Massacre." 101
There is a vital difference between the power of a court to appoint an
attorney and the power of a court to conscript an unwilling attorney and
compel him to represent a client over his objection. While a lawyer has
an ethical obligation to render service in the public interest, the accept-
ance of court appointments is just one of several alternatives available to
meet this obligation.
A lawyer who shirks this ethical obligation may be subject to appro-
98. Id. at 29. Cf Tower v. Glover, 104 S. Ct. 2820 (1984).
99. See 1963 U.S. ATT'Y GEN. COMM. ON POVERTY AND THE ADMIN. OF FED. CRIMI-
NAL JUSTICE 37.
100. Rostow, supra note 97, at 29-30.
101. Adams was retained in that case for a one-guinea fee. P. SMITH, A NEW AGE Now
BEGINS 346 (1976).
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priate professional discipline. But the courts are not empowered to en-
force the obligation on a selective basis by compelling private attorneys
to accept appointments to represent particular clients.
California courts have frequently exercised their power to make ap-
pointments of private counsel, but no reported decisions uphold the
power of a court to compel a private lawyer to accept an appointment
over his or her objection. The cases which discuss the power of the court
over the assignment of public defenders, while not entirely consistent
with each other, are totally consistent with a denial of the power to com-
pel private lawyers to accept appointments.
In Mowrer v. Superior Court, °2 the court held that an order compel-
ling a deputy public defender to appear in a particular division at a par-
ticular time "to represent defendants in matters assigned and to be
assigned" was in excess of the jurisdiction of the superior court. While
conceding the inherent power of the court to control the proceedings
before it, and noting the power conferred by statute "[tio control, in fur-
therance of justice, the conduct of its ministerial officers, and of all other
persons in any manner connected with a judicial proceeding before it, in
every manner appertaining thereto," ' the court found a significant limi-
tation upon those powers: "The court's right to control its own proceed-
ings must be exercised in the light of 'the fundamental interest of the
public in maintaining an independent bar.' ""o4
The court concluded that the power of the court to control an attor-
ney's appearances arises only after the attorney has a matter before the
court:
Petitioner concedes the fact that in any given case, as any
other attorney, he can be ordered to appear in any department
of respondent court at a given time if he has a matter scheduled
in that department. However, petitioner correctly contends
that there is no basis upon which the respondent court can ap-
propriate his exclusive services and order him to be present
continually in Department 115 between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m. of
every working day.105
Significantly, the Mowrer court equated the public defender with
private attorneys: "The judge in a trial court has no more authority or
control over a public defender than any other attorney practicing before
102. 3 Cal. App. 3d 223, 83 Cal. Rptr. 125 (1969).
103. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 128(5) (West 1968 & Supp. 1985).
104. 3 Cal. App. 3d at 230, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 129 (quoting Smith v. Superior Court, 68 Cal,
2d 547, 560, 440 P.2d 65, 79, 68 Cal. Rptr. 1, 13 (1968).
105. Id. at 231, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 129.
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the court."' 6 In Ligda v. Superior Court,"7 on the other hand, the court
asserted greater control over public defenders than over private lawyers.
In holding that a deputy public defender could be compelled to assist a
defendant who chose to represent himself, the court relied upon its statu-
tory authority to control the conduct of ministerial officers: "The public
defender as a ministerial officer of the court does not have the power to
decline an assignment to defend or any function thereof, as if he were a
private attorney. He is employed by the people to render such
services. ' 1° 8
It must be noted that the deputy in Ligda had already accepted ap-
pointment to represent the defendant prior to the defendant's assertion of
his right of self-representation. Thus, even Ligda does not stand for the
proposition that any lawyer, including a public defender, can be com-
pelled to accept an initial appointment.' 0 9
In Chaleff v. Superior Court,"0 a deputy public defender was held in
contempt of court for declining an appointment to serve as "advisory
counsel" to a defendant who insisted upon his right of self-representa-
tion. The attorney cited, among his reasons for declining the appoint-
ment, conflicts with the client over what defenses or witnesses should be
presented and adverse consequences to his other case load. The court of
appeal vacated the judgment of contempt, concluding that Rule 2-111 of
the California Rules of Professional Responsibility permits a lawyer to
withdraw from representation of a client whenever the duty to a client
impinges upon his ethical responsibility as a member of the bar. Noting
that public defenders "are subject to the Rules of Professional Conduct
governing the action of lawyers no less than other members of the State
Bar," the court concluded that Chaleff went as far as he could in disclos-
ing his untenable ethical position without divulging privileged informa-
tion."' The court noted that its reliance upon Rule 2-111 required
neither agreement nor disagreement with Ligda, characterizing that case
as holding "that a deputy public defender may, with his consent, be ap-
pointed as advisory counsel despite the absence of authority for such an
appointment in Government Code section 27706."' 12 While Mowrer,
Ligda and Chaleff are somewhat inconsistent on the issue of whether the
courts have greater control over public defenders than over private attor-
106. Id. at 230, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 129.
107. 5 Cal. App. 3d 811, 85 Cal. Rptr. 744 (1970).
108. Id. at 827, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 754 (emphasis added).
109. Id. at 826, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 753.
110. 69 Cal. App. 3d 721, 138 Cal. Rptr. 735 (1977).
111. Id. at 724, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 737.
112. Id. at 725 n.2, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 737 n.2 (emphasis added).
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neys, the California Supreme Court has squarely held that the attorney-
client relationship is entitled to the same respect whether the attorney be
retained, appointed, or a public defender. 13
The concern for the independence of the bar and the inviolability of
the attorney-client relationship expressed in these cases lends strong sup-
port to the argument that California courts lack the power to conscript
unwilling attorneys to represent assigned clients. The acceptance of a
client by a lawyer involves a complex set of professional and personal
judgments. The lawyer cannot and should not accept a client unless he
concludes that:
(1) He or she possesses "the learning and skill ordinarily possessed
by lawyers in good standing who perform, but do not specialize in, simi-
lar services";114
(2) The employment is not adverse to a client, a former client, the
lawyer's own self-interest or any other conflicting interest; 115
(3) He has adequate time to pursue the matter with reasonable dil-
igence. "When an attorney takes on more than he can properly handle,
he jeopardizes both his client's cause and the public interest in sound and
efficient administration of justice"; 6
(4) Representation of the client is not likely to result in an unrea-
sonable financial burden on the lawyer;
1 7
(5) The intensity of any personal feeling of repugnance for the cli-
ent will not impair the effectiveness of his representation of the client.'18
The evaluation of these factors requires intensive self-assessment
and examination of conscience that only the lawyer involved can per-
form. The courts must presume that this professional judgment is made
in good faith. If a lawyer's assessment of his own competency, potential
conflicts, existing workload, current financial ability or intensity of per-
sonal feelings is to be second-guessed and overridden by an appointing
court, the effectiveness of the ensuing attorney-client relationship may be
doomed from the start. This is not to suggest that a lawyer is always the
final judge of whether he is meeting his responsibility to serve the public
113. Ingram v. Justice Court, 69 Cal. 2d 832, 840-41, 447 P.2d 650, 654-55, 73 Cal. Rptr.
410, 414-15 (1968); Smith v. Superior Court, 68 Cal. 2d 547, 582, 440 P.2d 65, 75, 68 Cal.
Rptr. 1, 11 (1968).
114. CAL. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 6-101(1), quoted in Lewis v. State Bar,
28 Cal. 3d 683, 621 P.2d 258, 170 Cal. Rptr. 634 (1981).
115. CAL. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 4-101, 5-101-02.
116. Lopez v. Larson, 91 Cal. App. 3d 383, 400, 153 Cal. Rptr. 912, 922 (1979).
117. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 6.2(b) (1981).
118. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 6.2(c) (1981); MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-30 (1981).
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interest. That question might be addressed in a disciplinary proceeding
brought by the bar, a forum which protects both the lawyer's interest in
the privacy of his or her financial affairs and conscience, and the privacy
of his or her other clients whose cases may create conflicts or excessive
workload.
The necessity for courts to defer to the good faith judgments of at-
torneys who seek to decline appointment has been recognized in the re-
ported decisions of Florida and Ohio. In Easley v. State,1 19 the Florida
District Court of Appeal reversed a judgment of contempt against a law-
yer who filed a client's affidavit concurring in the lawyer's own assess-
ment of incompetence after the trial court had denied a previous motion
to withdraw.12° The trial court interpreted counsel's action as "a scheme
to secure release from appellant's obligation as an attorney to assist the
court in the representation of indigent criminal defendants." '121 On ap-
peal, the court concluded that counsel who feels himself incompetent to
represent a client, despite a court order to provide such representation,
has a duty "to communicate his feelings of lack of competence" to the
client:
There is no finding, nor indeed on the evidence could there be,
that appellant did not in good faith feel his inadequacy to han-
dle felonies. Moreover, in accord with the ethical obligations of
an attorney, we think it was incumbent upon appellant to com-
municate his feelings of lack of competence to the defendant.122
The Florida court recognized that a lawyer's own conclusions about
his competency, his conflicting loyalties, his availability and solvency and
his feelings of repugnance are likely to interfere with the lawyer-client
relationship, regardless of the fact that an appointing court may disagree
with those conclusions:
The court's finding of appellant's competence in criminal mat-
ters wouldn't make it a fact; and nothing in the evidence im-
peaches appellant's assertion to the contrary. Furthermore,
appellant never actually refused to represent [defendant] in con-
travention of the court order. He simply informed the defend-
ant, as he should have, that he felt incompetent to represent
him and thereafter filed a motion consistent with the desires of
his client. He could have done no less and is not guilty of con-
119. 334 So. 2d 630 (Fla. 1976).
120. Id. at 635.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 632.
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tempt for doing so.123
A similar dilemma was presented to the Ohio Court of Appeals in
State v. Gasen.1 21 There, the trial court appointed a deputy public de-
fender to represent a criminal defendant over the lawyer's objection that
he could not effectively represent the client and that to do so would vio-
late the Code of Professional Responsibility, since the defendant was al-
ready represented by another lawyer who had failed to appear.
Significantly, the court of appeals held that a lawyer's duty to decline to
represent a client is no different when the attorney is appointed by the
court than it would be if the client walked in off the street:
Clearly, the ethics of the legal profession demand that any
attorney, private or public, decline to represent a party when
such attorney is unable, for valid reasons, to fully and ade-
quately prepare such party's case, or when such party is already
represented by competent counsel. Failure of an attorney to
decline to perform such representation may result in discipli-
nary measures being taken against him.
1 25
Since the duty to decline employment arises from such a complex
matrix of ethical judgments by the attorney involved, it is difficult to
imagine any circumstances in which a court would be justified in substi-
tuting its judgment for that of the attorney.
It must also be noted that the risks which a court imposes upon an
unwilling attorney with a mandatory appointment go far beyond the dis-
ruption of the normal lawyer-client relationship. The risks may extend
to the harassment of subsequent malpractice suits. In Ferri v. Acker-
man,'26 the United States Supreme Court held that attorneys appointed
to represent indigent clients in federal criminal proceedings are not enti-
tled to the absolute immunity conferred upon judges and prosecutors. In
so doing, however, the Court noted that the increased risk of malpractice
liability for such lawyers was "not implausible":
Respondent argues that there are valid policy reasons that jus-
tify an immunity for appointed counsel not accorded privately
retained counsel. The claim is that a defendant's relationship
with appointed counsel is substantially different than it would
be with retained counsel because of the inability to choose and
freely to discharge counsel. See, e.g., Criminal Justice Act Plan
for the Western District of Pennsylvania § IV A(3). The de-
123. Id. (emphasis in original).
124. 48 Ohio App. 2d 191, 356 N.E.2d 505 (1976).
125. Id. at 193, 356 N.E.2d at 507 (emphasis in original).
126. 444 U.S. 193 (1979).
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fendant would therefore tend to perceive appointed counsel as a
representative of the government and to view him with suspi-
cion. After conviction, a defendant's inevitable bitterness
would lead to a high risk of retaliatory law suits, the same fear
that underlies immunity for judges and prosecutors. Butz v.
Economou, 438 U.S. 478. Further, because of the increased
risk of malpractice actions, appointed counsel would be more
susceptible to pressure from clients to call additional witnesses
or to make additional arguments that would, in fact, prejudice
the defendant's own case. But respondent has not directed our
attention to any empirical data-in judicial decisions, legisla-
tive hearings, or scholarly studies-to support his conclusions
that the risk of malpractice litigation deters members of the pri-
vate bar from accepting the representation of indigent defend-
ants or adversely affects the quality of representation. Given
the speculative, though not implausible, nature of respondent's
arguments, we are unwilling to ascribe to Congress an intent to
accord an immunity to appointed counsel not given retained
counsel in the face of the silent legislative history on this
point.
127
Significantly, the Court avoided this problem in Ferri by assuming
that lawyers were free to decline such appointments. Noting that the risk
of malpractice liability must be offset by the level of compensation of-
fered to ensure a supply of lawyers willing to accept appointments, the
Court left that equation for Congress to resolve.
128
The dilemma of compelling appointed attorneys to accept the risk of
subsequent litigation with their court-imposed client can find no better
illustration than the case of Bradshaw v. District Court. 29 The plaintiff
sought appointment of counsel to represent her in an action brought
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. While the Act autho-
rizes the appointment of counsel,130 Congress has never appropriated
funds to compensate lawyers for such appointments. Numerous lawyers
declined to accept appointment, not just because of the expense involved,
but because of the plaintiff's reputation for turning on her lawyers. The
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals characterized the case as follows:
Bradshaw has been a litigant in numerous cases over the last
ten years in municipal, superior, and federal courts. Attorneys
127. Id. at 200-01 n.17.
128. Id. at 204-05.
129. 742 F.2d 515 (9th Cir. 1984).
130. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5()(1)(B) (1982).
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who have been appointed to represent her interests in the past
have themselves been the subject of court hearings and public
exposure due to questions raised by Bradshaw about their com-
petency and ability to represent her interests.
... Moreover, the district court found that members of the
bar were afraid of jeopardizing their malpractice insurance cov-
erage and concerned they would be subject to state bar discipli-
nary proceedings. These fears apparently stem from their
assessment of the merits of Bradshaw's claims, coupled with
the present willingness of litigants to join attorneys with their
clients as defendants in seeking redress from frivolous, meritless
or vexatious claims.
1 3 1
These concerns led the court to uphold the district court's refusal to
make a coercive appointment of counsel, although it indicated its willing-
ness to uphold coercive appointments in other circumstances.
Ferri thus poses a question that must be addressed in any system
which relies upon involuntary appointments to provide representation to
civil litigants. If no immunity from subsequent malpractice liability is
afforded, then every lawyer subjected to an involuntary appointment is
saddled with the additional burden of insuring himself or herself against
the increased risk to which he is exposed. If immunity is afforded, the
indigent client is given less protection against incompetence than the
non-indigent. The dilemma can only be avoided by making the same
assumption that the Supreme Court made in Ferri: the acceptance of a
court-appointed client is a voluntary act by the attorney, who willingly
assumes all the risks and the rewards that the ensuing lawyer-client rela-
tionship might bring.
IV. SOME COLD EcONOMICS
I grew up in a generation that learned the lessons of what life is
really all about from the comic strips rather than from the television
tube. As an avid fan of Dick Tracy, Pogo and Li'l Abner, I assimilated
certain core principles and values that have been consistently reaffirmed
by my life experiences. One such principle is a very simple one: There is
generally a strong correlation between the quality of a product or service
and its price. In other words, you get what you pay for. The cartoon
character who taught this lesson most effectively was one created by Al
Capp in Li'l Abner-a judge by the name of "Marryin' Sam." "Marryin'
Sam" offered his customers a wide range of choices for a nuptial cere-
131. 742 F.2d at 517-18.
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mony, ranging from the simplest exchange of vows for twenty-five cents
all the way up to the greatest extravaganza imaginable-the eight-dollar
wedding. Here is "Marryin' Sam's" description of his eight-dollar
wedding:
Fust-Ah Strips t' th' waist, an' rassles th' four biggest guests!!
Next-a fast demon-stray-shun o' how t' cheat yore friends at
cards!!-follyed by four snappy jokes-guaranteed t' embarrass
man or beast-an'-then after ah dances a jig wif a pig, Ah
yanks out two o' mah teeth, an' presents 'em t' th' bride an'
groom-as mementos o' th' occasion!!-then-Ah really gits
going!!-Ah offers t' remove any weddin' guest's appendix, wif
mah bar hands-free!! Then yo' spreadeagles me, fastens mah
arms an' laigs t' four wild jackasses-an'-bam!! yo' fires a
gun!!-While they tears me t' pieces-Ah puffawms th' weddin'
ceremony!! 
32
Having accepted the lesson that you get what you pay for, which I
learned from "Marryin' Sam," I must confess that I was a bit skeptical
when I went to law school and was told that these principles had no
application to our system of justice. In the courtrooms of America, I was
told, every accused stands equal before the law. Both the millionaire and
the pauper are given the same right to counsel, and if you cannot afford a
lawyer, one will be provided without cost. When I first heard that, the
image of "Marryin' Sam" appeared in my head, saying I can give you a
twenty-five cent trial, in which I plead you guilty and throw you on the
mercy of the court, or I can give you an eight-dollar trial, in which we
hire investigators to interview witnesses, prepare charts and demonstra-
tions to dazzle the jury, employ consultants to cogitate, experts to pontif-
icate, and psychiatrists to prognosticate, and file reams of motions to
dismiss, to discover, to disqualify and to discombobulate. I was assured
that such images should be banished from my brain, however, because
they are unprofessional. After all, lawyers take an oath which perma-
nently eradicates avarice and greed from their breasts, and our system of
justice is immune from the law of supply and demand which dominates
the marketplace.
When I left law school and ventured into the criminal courts, how-
ever, my skepticism was rekindled. While I never saw a lawyer offer a
client a menu of choices akin to those offered by "Marryin' Sam," I
found that the full spectrum of such choices was still represented at the
bar. There were lawyers who pled every client guilty, and there were
132. BERGER, LI'L ABNER: A STUDY IN AMERICAN SATIRE 58 (1975).
Dec. 1985]
310 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 19:285
lawyers who put on eight-dollar trials, and generally which you got de-
pended on how much you had to pay.
My comic strip analogy should not be misinterpreted as a criticism
of the legal profession. I find it hard to fault lawyers for abiding by the
economic principles that guide every other human endeavor. Where I
find fault is in the pious hypocrisy which posits legal doctrine upon the
fiction that we are immune from the operation of those principles.
Although lawyers are reluctant to admit it, history confirms that
there is a direct relationship between the level of compensation provided
and the quality of services rendered to indigents. 133  Legislators and
courts must recognize that the answer to the question, "how much?",
must be preceded by the question "how good?" If we are serious about
the promise of equal justice, then we need to set a level of compensation
high enough to attract the same lawyers available to those with money to
pay. The criterion must ultimately be based on the law of supply and
demand. At what level of compensation will a broad cross-section of
competent lawyers be available to accept appointments?
"Reasonable" compensation does not necessarily imply compensa-
tion at the prevailing rates for comparable private sector employment,
although that is certainly a relevant factor. In Hill v. Superior Court,
134
the California Supreme Court interpreted the right to "reasonable com-
pensation" for court appointments pursuant to then section 987a of the
California Penal Code 35 and rejected the petitioner's claim that "reason-
able" fees should be determined by reference to private sector rates:
As we view the situation, it is essentially one where court-ap-
pointed counsel, as officers of the court, perform a public ser-
vice at public expense. More appropriate criteria, therefore,
may be found by considering the amounts deemed proper as
compensation for the services of court-appointed counsel in
other jurisdictions, and also by considering the compensation
paid to public officers generally.
1 36
While the conclusion in Hill that the prevailing rates for private
transactions should not control appears sound, the reliance upon ap-
pointed rates in other jurisdictions and the salaries of public employees
133. SMITH & BRADWAY, supra note 37, at 92-93.
134. 46 Cal. 2d 169, 293 P.2d 10 (1956).
135. Id. at 171, 293 P.2d at 11-12. "'In any case in which counsel is assigned in the supe-
rior court to defend a person who is charged therein with crime,... such counsel., shall
receive a reasonable sum for compensation and for necessary expenses, the amount of which
shall be determined by the court .... ' Id. (quoting 1951 Cal. Stat. 1160, § 2).
136. 46 Cal. 2d at 171, 293 P.2d at 12.
YARBROUGH v. SUPERIOR COURT
appears strained. Appointed rates vary greatly, ranging from ten dollars
per hour in some states to sixty-five dollars per hour in others. 137 These
variances often reflect differences in the cost of living and the community
tax base rather than judgments about the intrinsic value of services. The
salaries paid to public lawyers are also of limited relevance, since these
officials have no overhead expenses of maintaining an office. The basic
premise of Hill was that a lower level of compensation is justified by the
lawyer's duty to the "defenseless" pursuant to section 6068(h) of the
Business and Professions Code. 138 That premise is a faulty one if the
objective of providing "reasonable" compensation is to ensure competent
representation.
The Hill criteria were repudiated in the subsequent enactment of
Penal Code section 987.3, which enumerates the factors currently consid-
ered in determining reasonable compensation for court-appointed attor-
neys in criminal cases:
(a) Customary fee in the community for similar services ren-
dered by privately retained counsel to a nonindigent client.
(b) The time and labor required by the attorney.
(c) The difficulty of the defense.
(d) The novelty or uncertainty of the law upon which the de-
cision depended.
(e) The degree of professional ability, skill and experience
called for and exercised in the performance of the services.
(f) The professional character, qualification, and standing of
the attorney.
139
No one of these factors is deemed controlling.
There appears to be no reason why the same factors would not be of
equal relevance in setting reasonable fees for counsel appointed to civil
cases.
In this regard, it is interesting to note the provision for compensa-
tion in Yarbrough v. Superior Court civil appointments contained in Sen-
ate Bill 2057, which was vetoed by Governor Deukmejian in 1984."'°
The bill set forth the same factors listed in section 987.3, leaving the
amount of compensation up to the judge. But the following caveat was
added in a last-minute amendment on the Assembly floor:
In no event shall the award exceed the rate of reimbursement
for appointed counsel in comparable cases in the community.
137. BUREAU OF JusTIcE STATISTICS, supra note 75, at 5.
138. 46 Cal. 2d at 174-75, 293 P.2d at 14.
139. CAL. PENAL CODE § 987.3 (West Supp. 1985).
140. Cal. S.B. 2057, 1983-84 Reg. Sess. (1983). See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
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There shall be a presumption that the lowest rate for appointed
counsel in the community is the reasonable rate. . . . In no
event shall the rate exceed sixty dollars ($60) per hour. 141
Sixty dollars per hour is also the rate paid for representation of
death row inmates on their appeals before the California Supreme
Court. 42 The question we need to address is whether even that rate is
sufficient to attract a broad cross-section of competent lawyers to accept
appointments.
It is essential to carefully separate the economic issues raised by
compensation of counsel from the very different issues raised by reim-
bursement of counsel for the costs and expenses of litigation. To require
appointed counsel to pay these expenses out of his or her own pocket
creates a significant conflict of interest and violates the constitutional
guarantee that property will not be taken without due process of law. In
recognizing a limited right to appointment of counsel in Payne v. Supe-
rior Court,1 43 the California Supreme Court never addressed the ques-
tions posed by the costs and expenses of litigation. An obligation to
provide services cannot be expanded to include liability for the expenses
incurred in providing representation without creating a serious ethical
dilemma for appointed counsel.
The distinction between compensation for services and reimburse-
ment for expenses finds deeply rooted support in the ethical canons
which have traditionally guided the legal profession. Canon 42 of the
Canons of Professional Ethics, adopted by the American Bar Association
in 1928, provides: "A lawyer may not properly agree with a client that
the lawyer shall pay or bear the expenses of litigation; he may in good
faith advance expenses as a matter of convenience, but subject to
reimbursement.""
In Opinion 259, this canon was construed by the A.B.A. Committee
on Professional Ethics and Grievances to preclude lawyers from directly
advancing costs without an agreement for reimbursement when doing
volunteer legal work for servicemen: "We think, however, it would not
prohibit the committee [on war work] from advancing costs in indigent
cases out of funds provided for that purpose and, of course, a lawyer
member of the committee could subscribe to such a fund if he so
desired."
145
141. Cal. S.B. 2057, 1983-84 Reg. Sess., § 2 (1983) (Assembly amendment, July 6, 1984).
142. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1241 (West Supp. 1985).
143. 17 Cal. 3d 908, 533 P.2d 565, 132 Cal. Rptr. 405 (1976).
144. CANONS OF ETHICS Canon 42 (1928).
145. A.B.A. Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 259 (1957).
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This prohibition was incorporated in the Rules of Professional Con-
duct adopted pursuant to California Business and Professions Code sec-
tion 6076. Rule 5-104 prohibits any direct or indirect payment of
expenses for a client, with a limited exception which permits advancing
the costs of prosecuting or defending a claim or action.146
The A.B.A. carried forward the same proscription into the Code of
Professional Responsibility, promulgated in 1969. The disciplinary rules
codified under Canon 5, which addresses conflicts of interest, includes
DR 5-103:
Avoiding Acquisition of Interest in Litigation.
(B) While representing a client in connection with contem-
plated or pending litigation, a lawyer shall not advance or guar-
antee financial assistance to his client, except that a lawyer may
advance or guarantee the expenses of litigation, including court
costs, expenses of investigation, expenses of medical examina-
tion, and costs of obtaining and presenting evidence, provided
the client remains ultimately liable for such expenses.147
It is important to recognize that the prohibition of the lawyer's pay-
ment of costs and expenses of litigation has always coexisted with rules
allowing contingency fee agreements, although both give a lawyer an in-
terest in the litigation. The Ethical Considerations offered to explicate
Canon 5 directly addressed this dichotomy:
Although a contingent fee arrangement gives a lawyer a finan-
cial interest in the outcome of litigation, a reasonable contin-
gent fee is permissible in civil cases because it may be the only
means by which a layman can obtain the services of a lawyer of
his choice. But a lawyer, because he is in a better position to
evaluate a cause of action, should enter into a contingent fee
arrangement only in those instances where the arrangement
will be beneficial to the client. 148
A financial interest in the outcome of litigation also results
if monetary advances are made by the lawyer to his client.
146. CALIFORNIA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5-104 (1975). Even a guar-
anty of reimbursement, compelling an attorney to advance the cost and expenses of litigation,
would still constitute an unconstitutional taking of the attorney's property, since the attorney
is deprived of the income he or she could derive from investing the funds during the period of
time they are "advanced." Cf. Pierpont Inn, Inc. v. California, 70 Cal. 2d 282, 449 P.2d 737,
74 Cal. Rptr. 521 (1969).
147. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-103 (1981) (emphasis
added).
148. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-7 (1981).
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Although this assistance generally is not encouraged, there are
instances when it is not improper to make loans to a client. For
example, the advancing or guaranteeing of payment of the costs
and expenses of litigation by a lawyer may be the only way a
client can enforce his cause of action, but the ultimate liability
for such costs and expenses must be that of the client. 149
One can certainly question the significance of this distinction where
the lawyer represents a plaintiff. In that instance, the interests of the
lawyer and the client largely coincide: If the case is successful, the law-
yer is assured of both his or her fee and reimbursement of expenses, and
if the case is not successful, the lawyer's claim for reimbursement of ex-
penses may not be worth much. There may be a difference in the appear-
ance of propriety between cash outlays for a client and the devotion of
hours without billing. But the real risk of conflict seems academic. A
lawyer investing many hours of time in a case is unlikely to jeopardize his
client's interests, and his own, by not undertaking discovery or retaining
necessary experts simply to avoid the expense.15
The difference between compensation for services and reimburse-
ment for expenses assumes a very different posture, however, when the
lawyer is representing a defendant. There is no contingency: win or lose,
the lawyer will not be compensated. While the lawyer realizes that the
hours he or she devotes to the case carry no expectancy of reward, he or
149. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-8 (1981).
150. These considerations led to a revision of the A.B.A.'s Model Rules of Professional
Conduct adopted in August, 1983. Rule 1.5(e) now provides:
A lawyer shall not provide financial assistance to a client in connection with pending
or contemplated litigation, except that: (1) a lawyer may advance court costs and
expenses of litigation, the repayment of which may be contingent on the outcome of
the matter; and (2) a lawyer representing an indigent client may pay court costs and
expenses of litigation on behalf of the client.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.5(e) (1983). Rule 1.5(e)(1) simply recog-
nizes that the distinction between a contingent fee for services and contingent reimbursement
of expenses is a difference hardly worth preserving. Rule 1.5, however, requires that contin-
gent fee agreements clearly specify whether litigation expenses are to be deducted "before or
after the contingent fee is calculated." The comment to the Rule cautions lawyers that:
An agreement may not be made whose terms might induce the lawyer improperly to
curtail services for the client or perform them in a way contrary to the client's inter-
est. For example, a lawyer should not enter into an agreement whereby services are
to be provided only up to a stated amount when it is foreseeable that more extensive
services probably will be required, unless the situation is adequately explained to the
client. Otherwise the client might have to bargain for further assistance in the midst
of a proceeding or transaction.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.5, Comment 2 (1983). Rule 1.5(e)(2), of
course, goes no further than Opinion 259, supra note 141, in permitting a lawyer to contribute
court costs voluntarily in addition to contributing his services. The new A.B.A. Rules have
not been adopted in California.
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she accepts that consequence at the outset when he or she agrees to take
on the case. It is in making the dozens of tactical decisions that ensue
that a pervasive conflict of interest casts its cloud. Should the deposition
of a particular witness be taken? Should an expert be consulted or re-
tained? Each such decision requires the lawyer to reach for his own wal-
let and ask himself, "can I really afford this?"
The California Supreme Court has addressed the problem of the
conflict between a lawyer's financial self-interest and the interests of his
or her client in two recent cases. In People v. Barboza,151 the court found
that a budgetary scheme which reduced the compensation for the public
defender when a conflict of interest was declared deprived a criminal de-
fendant of the effective assistance of counsel by creating a direct "finan-
cial disincentive for the public defender either to investigate or declare
the existence of actual or potential conflicts of interest requiring the em-
ployment of other counsel."
152
In Maxwell v. Superior Court, '53 the court held that a criminal de-
fendant could waive the potential conflict created by a contract with his
retained counsel which gave the attorney publication rights to his life
story. While the court recognized the serious potential for conflict be-
tween counsel's economic motivations and the defendant's optimum trial
strategy, it concluded that the defendant's countervailing right to retain
counsel of his choice was controlling, and permitted a waiver of the con-
flict. However, the situation is dramatically different with appointed
counsel. To require an indigent to waive the conflict created by appoint-
ment of counsel who is required to pay the costs of litigation out of his
own pocket places an intolerable burden on the right to competent coun-
sel. Rather than a voluntary waiver, the indigent is compelled to accept
counsel with conflicting self-interest or proceed with no counsel at all.
Quite apart from the ethical dilemma of conflicting self-interest cre-
ated by appointment of counsel without reimbursement for expenses,
however, is the constitutional problem of taking counsel's property with-
out due process of law. In State ex rel. Wolff v. Ruddy, 54 while uphold-
ing a plan requiring counsel to provide services to indigents without
compensation, the Missouri Supreme Court held that this plan could not
151. 29 Cal. 3d 375, 627 P.2d 188, 173 Cal. Rptr. 458 (1981).
152. Id. at 379, 627 P.2d at 189, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 459.
153. 30 Cal. 3d 606, 639 P.2d 248, 180 Cal. Rptr. 177 (1982).
154. 617 S.W.2d 64 (Mo. 1981). See also State ex rel. Scott v. Roper, 688 S.W.2d 757 (Mo.
1985), where the Missouri Supreme Court held that "the courts of this state have no inherent
power to appoint or compel attorneys to serve in civil actions without compensation." Id. at
769.
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require attorneys to advance personal funds for costs or expenses.15 In
Williamson v. Vardeman,156 a federal writ of habeas corpus was granted
to an attorney who had been held in contempt by a Missouri judge for
refusing to accept an appointment which would require him to advance
the costs of taking depositions, hiring an investigator and retaining ex-
perts to evaluate laboratory evidence. The court concluded:
Requiring lawyers to pay the necessary expenses of criminal de-
fense work without reimbursement is, however, constitutionally
distinct from merely compelling lawyers to provide their serv-
ices. Expenses might include investigatory services, deposition
costs, witness fees, payment of expert witnesses, and similar
outlays. While we understand that in many cases, because of
lost opportunities and payment of fixed costs, the burden of
providing services without compensation is comparable to that
of paying expenses, lawyers have no duty to pay expenses. The
class of lawyers has no more obligation to pay such expenses
than any other class of citizens. Compelling individual attor-
neys to bear such costs raises serious due process issues....
Counsel's rights were violated when he was asked to pay the
expense involved in defending an indigent and held in contempt
when he refused to assume the defense under these conditions.
Thus, although we find Missouri has adopted a constitu-
tional procedure, we hold the trial court impermissibly failed to
implement that procedure by denying counsel's request for an
order requiring the State to pay his expenses or upon the State's
failure to so pay, that the court discharge the accused. If this
procedure had been followed, counsel would have been relieved
of his appointment. This did not happen. Counsel was thus
ordered to advance payment of funds necessary to the defense
of the accused. We find that execution of this order would con-
stitute a "taking" of counsel's property without just compensa-
tion in violation of the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. 
157
The Supreme Court of New Hampshire recently expressed agree-
ment with both of these cases in holding that a denial of full reimburse-
ment of expenses to an attorney appointed to represent an indigent was
an unconstitutional taking of property. 58 In addition to Missouri and
155. 617 S.W.2d at 67.
156. 674 F.2d 1211 (8th Cir. 1982).
157. Id. at 1215-16 (emphasis added).
158. State v. Robinson, 123 N.H. 665, 465 A.2d 1214, 1217 (1983).
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New Hampshire, three other states which have rejected a right of com-
pensation for the services of appointed counsel have carefully distin-
guished counsel's right to reimbursement for out-of-pocket
expenditures. 59
The right to competent counsel becomes a meaningless gesture if
counsel for an indigent is denied the use of working tools essential to the
establishment of a tenable claim or defense.' 60  To require appointed
counsel to supply these tools out of his own pocket, however, would im-
pose an intolerable conflict of interest upon the client and an unconstitu-
tional deprivation of property upon counsel. Thus, full reimbursement
for expenses is constitutionally compelled.
The right to reimbursement for expenses must be limited, however,
to reasonably necessary expenses. Some control is necessary to prevent
expenditure of public funds on the employment of experts or pursuit of
discovery where cost far exceeds the value. In the criminal context, this
control is exerted by requiring court approval of such expenditures,
based on an in camera showing. 16 ' A similar procedure could be imple-
mented to control expenditures in civil actions.
V. SOME COLD POLITICS
As a result of the cutbacks in funding for legal services programs,
many of those who qualify as indigent are not being served by the pro-
grams in California. 162 New "volunteer" programs have fallen far short
of filling the gap.1 63 This fiscal reality has required legal services pro-
grams to allocate scarce resources to the cases of greatest need. Invaria-
bly, "need" is defined by reference to what is at stake. Those clients
facing the most immediate threat of the most irretrievable losses get
priority.
In constructing a program to respond to the challenge of Yarbrough
v. Superior Court, it should be obvious that resources are not immediately
159. People v. Kinion, 97 Ill. 2d 322, 328, 454 N.E.2d 625, 630-32 (1983); State v. Second
Judicial Dist. Court, 85 Nev. 241, 243, 453 P.2d 421, 422-23 (1969); State v. Horton, 34 N.J.
518, 525, 170 A.2d 1, 9-10 (1961); State v. Rush, 46 N.J. 399, 408, 217 A.2d 441, 450 (1966);
State ex rel. Antini, 53 N.J. 488, 491, 251 A.2d 291, 294 (1969).
160. Cf. Ake v. Oklahoma, 105 S. Ct. 1087 (1985); People v. Gunnerson, 74 Cal. App. 3d
370, 379, 141 Cal. Rptr. 488, 493 (1977).
161. CAL. PENAL CODE § 987.2 (West Supp. 1985); Puett v. Superior Court, 96 Cal. App.
3d 936, 158 Cal. Rptr. 266 (1979).
162. Cochran, Down and Out in the Valley, CAL. LAW., June, 1984, at 51; Smegal, The
Future of Federal Funding of Civil Legal Services for Indigents, SAN FRANCISCO Ar'y, Apr.-
May 1985, at 18.
163. Hager, Private Bar Offering LegalAid to Poor, Filling Gap Left by U.S. Cutbacks, L.A.
Times, July 29, 1984, Part I, at 10, col. 1.
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available to fulfill the counsel needs of every indigent litigant. In a way,
it may be unfortunate that Yarbrough became a vehicle for the recogni-
tion of a right to reasonably compensated counsel. In structuring a list of
priorities based on need, it is unlikely that many would place convicted
felons who are sued for damages by their victims near the top of the list
and in front of elderly or mentally disabled persons facing eviction,'
immigrants facing deportation, or parents facing loss of their children.
While a persuasive argument can be made that the access of prisoners to
the courts should receive high priority, 6 ' the real reason cases like Yar-
brough move to the front of the line is because the state is directly in-
volved in the deprivation which creates the need for counsel. 166 While
this element of state action triggers recognition of a right to counsel, it is
hardly the most relevant factor in objectively identifying those indigent
litigants who have the greatest need for counsel.
In this respect, the evolution of a right to counsel for civil litigants
assumes a very different posture from the evolution of that right in crimi-
nal cases. In the criminal context, some very distinct and very relevant
lines of demarcation were available. The earliest recognition of a right to
counsel was limited to capital cases, where the defendant's life was at
stake. 167 Thirty years later, the right was extended to felony cases in
which the defendant faced a risk of imprisonment for more than one
year.'16  Only nine years later, in 1972, the right was extended to misde-
meanor cases which actually lead to incarceration. 69 As the history of
implementation of the right to counsel in criminal cases shows,' 7 ' the
expansion of state efforts closely parallels the constitutional mandates.
While the guidelines are not as clear, the courts which have recog-
nized a right to counsel for civil litigants repeatedly stressed that the
interest at stake is an important dimension in defining this right. 17 1 To
some extent, the Yarbrough opinion recognizes this element by its insis-
164. See Quail v. Municipal Court, 85 Daily J. D.A.R., Aug. 23, 1985, at 2996 (Johnson, J.,
dissenting).
165. Ducey, Survey of Prisoner Access to the Courts: Local Experimentation a' Bounds, 9
NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. AND CIv. CONFINEMENT 47 (1983); Note, A Prisoner's Constitutional
Right to Attorney Assistance, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 1279 (1983).
166. Payne v. Superior Court, 17 Cal. 3d 908, 915-17, 553 P.2d 565, 571-72, 132 Cal. Rptr.
405, 412 (1976). Cf. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 352-68 (1981) (Brennan, J., concur-
ring); Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977).
167. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
168. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
169. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972). See also Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367
(1979).
170. See supra text accompanying notes 29-87.
171. Catz & Firak, The Right to Appointed Counsel in Quasi-Criminal Cases: Towards an
Effective Assistance of Counsel Standard, 19 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 397 (1984); Herman &
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tence upon a detailed inquiry directed to "finding a potential for loss that
is not wholly ephemeral."' 72 Leaving the determination of a particular
defendant's need for counsel to ad hoc judicial assessment is not a satis-
factory solution. Inconsistency in rulings can be anticipated, and the ini-
tial hurdle of showing the need for a lawyer will become a complex task
which itself requires a lawyer's assistance. Legislative or administrative
guidelines should be formulated to identify the classes of cases in which
the necessity for counsel can be presumed. When such a list is com-
posed, however, consideration must be given to the non-incarcerated in-
digents who are named as defendants in these same categories of cases.
Should the limitations on those defendants' access to the courts, by virtue
of physical disabilities, inability to speak or understand English, or simi-
lar handicaps, entitle them to the assistance of counsel? The fact that a
court has not declared that these categories of people possess a constitu-
tional right to counsel 73 should not dissuade the legislature from ad-
dressing and prioritizing these defendants' needs as well.174
The challenge of Yarbrough also presents a unique opportunity to
avoid one of the major problems presented by our system of financing the
appointment of counsel for indigents in criminal cases: the disparity in-
jected by local financing. By creating a system to finance the appoint-
ment of counsel in civil cases on a statewide basis, uniform standards can
be assured and local political pressures which are resistant to change can
be avoided.
Currently, each county in California must provide the funds to oper-
ate a public defender's office, or pay the costs of appointing private law-
yers pursuant to section 987.2 of the Penal Code, or both.'75 State funds
Donahue, Fathers Behind Bars: The Right to Counsel in Civil Contempt Proceedings, 14
N.M.L. REv. 275 (1984).
172. 39 Cal. 3d 197, 205, 702 P.2d 583, 592, 216 Cal. Rptr. 425, 434 (1985).
173. The persuasive legal arguments for an extension of the right to counsel recognized in
Payne to other indigent litigants are presented in Johnson & Schwartz, Beyond Payne: The
Case for a Legally Enforceable Right to Representation in Civil Cases for Indigent California
Litigants, 11 LoY. L.A.L. REv. 249 (1978).
174. Senate Bill 2057 would have limited compensation to attorneys appointed to cases in
which the defendant "has the constitutional right to be represented by counsel." Cal. S.B.
2057, 1983-84 Reg. Sess., § 1 (1983); see supra note 17 and accompanying text. This may
create an open-ended invitation for the courts to expand the categories of cases in which the
right to counsel will be given constitutional recognition. Prioritizing competing claims to
scarce resources and identifying the categories of cases in which all indigent defendants should
be provided with appointed counsel who will be publicly compensated are tasks best handled
by the legislature.
175. Where a public defender is unavailable due to conflict of interest or prior caseload, the
courts may appoint a private lawyer. CAL. PENAL CODE § 987.2(a) (West Supp. 1985). The
rising cost of such appointments has led some California counties to contract with private
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are available only in three exceptional situations:
(1) Where the defendant is a prisoner charged with a criminal of-
fense committed during his confinement in state prison, the costs of his
defense are chargeable to the State Department of Corrections." 6
(2) Where the defendant is charged with a capital offense, the ex-
penses for investigators, experts and others necessary for the preparation
of a defense are reimbursed to counties by the state.177 Such reimburse-
ment is not available where the death penalty is precluded, however, such
as in the case of a juvenile defendant 78 or a case in which the prosecu-
tion has stipulated the death penalty will not be sought. 179 This arrange-
ment may actually provide an incentive for prosecutors to seek the death
penalty in cases where they might otherwise seek life without parole. By
prosecuting the case as a capital one, the county may be able to charge
thousands of dollars in expenses to the state.
(3) The legislature may approliriate funds to reimburse counties
for up to ten percent of their expenditures for public defenders or ap-
pointed counsel. 181 While this option has been available since 1965, it
has rarely been exercised.
Local funding has created a serious problem for some less populous
counties, in which a single major case can threaten the solvency of the
county government. 18' A dramatic example of such a crisis was
presented in the case of Corenevsky v. Superior Court.182 The prosecutor
originally charged ,Corenevsky with murder, alleging special circum-
stances required for imposition of the death penalty. 183 Pursuant to a
California decision allowing a second defense lawyer to be appointed in
capital cases, 184 the court appointed a private lawyer to assist the public
attorneys to accept all such appointments, or to establish a separate "alternate" public de-
fender office. See STANDING COMMITTEE, supra note 80.
176. Sections 4700 and 6005 of the California Penal Code impose all costs of such trials on
the Department of Corrections. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 4700, 6005 (West Supp. 1985). Com-
pensation and expenses for appointed defense attorneys are included in these costs. 11 OP.
CAL. ATT'Y GEN. 273 (1948). Even where the public defender is appointed to represent a
prisoner in such cases, reasonable fees for his services may be charged to the Department of
Corrections. CAL. PENAL CODE § 987.2(c) (West Supp. 1985).
177. CAL. PENAL CODE § 987.9 (West Supp. 1985); CAL. REV. & TAX CODE § 2231 (West
Supp. 1985).
178. County of San Diego v. Board of Control, 161 Cal. App. 3d 868, 207 Cal. Rptr. 886
(1984).
179. Sand v. Superior Court, 34 Cal. 3d 567, 668 P.2d 787, 194 Cal. Rptr. 480 (1983).
180. CAL. PENAL CODE § 987.6(a) (West Supp. 1985).
181. Kirsch, Rural Justice at the Crossroads, CAL. LAW., Apr. 1984, at 22.
182. 36 Cal. 3d 307, 682 P.2d 360, 204 Cal. Rptr. 165 (1984).
183. Id. at 314, 682 P.2d at 367, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 173.
184. Keenan v. Superior Court, 31 Cal. 3d 424, 640 P.2d 108, 180 Cal. Rptr. 489 (1982).
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defender. When the county refused to pay the costs for the second law-
yer, the court ordered the charges reduced so the death penalty could not
be sought. Defense counsel then sought the appointment of four expert
witnesses. Since the case was no longer capital, such appointments could
not be funded at state expense under California Penal Code section
987.9.185 The county refused to pay for the experts, alleging that the
$13,314 requested would "bankrupt" the county.'8 6 When the County
Auditor ignored a court order to make payment, he was held in con-
tempt of court. The California Supreme Court upheld the contempt or-
der, holding that county officials have no authority to review judicial
determinations authorizing the expenditure of such funds: "To hold
otherwise would be to encourage and facilitate local government intru-
sion into exclusive powers of the judiciary. As stated above, it is solely a
judicial question whether a given defendant shall be afforded requested
defense services."'
187
The court also rejected a suggestion that trial courts be required to
"balance" the demonstrated need for defense services against the bud-
geted monies available in determining whether the request is reasonable.
The court concluded that "such a rule would pose serious problems of
equal protection: it would directly condition a defendant's right to ancil-
lary services, and hence effectiveness of counsel, on the fisc of the county
in which he is being prosecuted."'""
The problem of local funding for defense services in criminal cases
may create support for a measure to permit state funding of all expenses
of court operations. 8 9 But many California lawyers are hesitant to place
ultimate control of the funding of all indigent defense services in the
Keenan held that payment of second counsel was not encompassed by § 987.9 of the California
Penal Code, which would allow state funding, but fell under §§ 987b and 987.2 of the Penal
Code, which require local funding. Id. at 430, 640 P.2d at 111, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 492-93. The
state legislature subsequently provided for such state funding. CAL. PENAL CODE § 987(d)
(West Supp. 1985).
185. Corenevsky, 36 Cal. 3d at 314, 682 P.2d at 363, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 169. Appointment of
experts can be made in non-capital cases. CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 730-731 (West 1968 & Supp.
1985). Such appointments must be paid from county funds. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 29603
(West 1968 & Supp. 1985).
186. 36 Cal. 3d at 315, 682 P.2d at 364, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 169.
187. Id. at 326, 682 P.2d at 371, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 176.
188. Id. at 320 n.13, 682 P.2d at 367 n.13, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 172 n.13.
189. On October 2, 1985, Governor George Deukmejian signed A.B. 19, authorizing a mas-
sive shift to state funding of trial courts in California instead of the local funding which previ-
ously prevailed. The bill will not be implemented until funds are appropriated in the state
budget, however. The Governor announced he would seek enactment of court reform meas-
ures before implementing state funding. Roberts, "Deukmejian Signs Bill to Let State Fund
Trial Courts," L.A. Daily J., Oct. 4, 1985, § 1, at 1.
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hands of the Governor. 190 In other states, a trend toward statewide
funding of all defense services for indigents in criminal cases is readily
discernible.19' In eighteen states, including Oregon,' 92 state government
now provides all funding.'93
The argument for state funding of the costs of appointed counsel is
even more compelling for civil cases than for criminal cases. At least in
criminal cases the county may choose not to prosecute a case if it wishes
to avoid the expense of appointed counsel. 194 In civil cases, where the
choice of venue is made by a private litigant, that choice is governed by
tactical considerations having little to do with the solvency of the county.
The problem is especially significant in cases such as Yarbrough involv-
ing prisoners. The twelve largest prisons in California are located in
largely rural counties with relatively small lawyer populations. 195 If civil
suits naming prisoners as defendants are filed in the county in which the
prisoner is incarcerated, the cost of providing defense services will fall
disproportionately on the local budgets of the rural counties in which
large prisons are located.
VI. CONCLUSION: A WARM EXHORTATION
The disposition of Yarbrough v. Superior Court is a cry for help. In
an era when the courts are constantly criticized for taking on the man-
agement of social problems beyond their expertise, this exercise in judi-
cial restraint deserves an energetic response. The most constructive
approach to the pot boiling on our backburner is to coldly assess the
lessons of history, ethics, economics and politics.
History should teach us that a double standard of justice is inevita-
ble if we consign the indigent to seeking handouts from uncompensated
190. See infra Financing the Right to Counsel in California, 19 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 405
(1985) (Discussion Groups). Under California law, the Governor can veto individual line
items in the state budget. CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 10(b). In 1983, Governor Deukmejian
exercised that power to cut the budget of the State Public Defender's Office in half. State of
Calif., Budget for Fiscal Year 1983-84, Final Change Book, at 488-89 (1983).
191. See Financing the Right to Counsel in California, 19 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 391 (1985)
(Remarks of N. Lefstein).
192. Oregon recently enacted legislation shifting funding from the local to the state level.
See id. at 399 (remarks of R. Linden).
193. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 75, at 6.
194. Although venue in criminal cases lies in the county where a crime was committed, in
many cases prosecutors may choose between several options since venue may lie in more than
one county. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 182, 184 (West 1968 & Supp. 1985) (prosecution
for conspiracy may be brought in any county where any overt act committed).
195. See Brief of Amici Curiae, Ventura County Bar Ass'n at 16-19, Yarbrough v. Superior
Court, 39 Cal. 3d 197, 702 P.2d 583, 216 Cal. Rptr. 425 (1985).
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volunteers. Ethics should teach us that if indigent clients deserve the
same level of competence in their representation that other clients com-
mand, then the only way to insure that standard is by giving them access
to the same pool of lawyers. Creating a caste of court-mandated volun-
teers who must reach into their own pockets to finance their clients' liti-
gation deprives the indigent of the independent, conflict-free
representation to which every client is entitled. Economics should teach
us that legal services respond to the same laws of supply and demand as
do other products and services in our free economy. Unless a full cross-
section of the bar is attracted to the representation of indigents, two
classes of justice are inevitable. Politics should teach us that the priori-
tization of competing claims for scarce resources is essentially a legisla-
tive process. The buck-passing should stop, and. the prioritizing should
begin, with standards which are uniform throughout the State of
California.
Ultimately, our response to the challenge of Yarbrough will fully
test the depth of our commitment to the ideal of equal justice for all.
That ideal must be pursued just as vigorously by legislators and gover-
nors as by judges. The spectre of two classes of lawyers serving two
classes of justice to two classes of clients makes hypocrites of us all. It
makes the blindfold on our statue of justice the mask of a dissembler.
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